In recent years, the United States has faced increasing challenges to its seapower from adversaries such as China and Russia. As these countries invest heavily in their naval capabilities, the U.S. Navy has struggled to keep up due to a lack of resources and outdated technology. One critical area that has been overlooked is the reliance on Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology for critical components in naval ships, particularly microelectronics.
The use of COTS technology, especially in the form of Commercially Available Microprocessors (CHIPS), poses a significant risk to U.S. seapower. These off-the-shelf components are often vulnerable to cyberattacks and can be easily compromised by adversaries. In today’s digital age, where cyber warfare is becoming increasingly prevalent, relying on COTS technology for critical military systems is akin to gambling with national security.
One of the main reasons for the use of COTS technology in naval ships is cost. Building custom, secure microelectronics for each ship would be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. However, the cost of a potential cyberattack on U.S. naval vessels far outweighs the initial savings of using CHIPS.
Furthermore, the reliance on COTS technology has led to supply chain vulnerabilities. Many of these components are manufactured in countries such as China, which has a track record of using its supply chain as a tool for espionage. By incorporating these components into U.S. naval ships, the country is essentially inviting potential adversaries to infiltrate its critical military systems.
To address this critical issue, the U.S. Navy must prioritize investing in secure, custom microelectronics for its ships. This will require a significant upfront investment, but the long-term benefits in terms of national security far outweigh the costs. By developing its own microelectronics, the Navy can ensure that its ships are protected from cyber threats and maintain a technological edge over its adversaries.
In addition to investing in secure microelectronics, the Navy must also work to diversify its supply chain to reduce reliance on potentially hostile nations. By sourcing components from a variety of countries and manufacturers, the Navy can mitigate the risk of supply chain vulnerabilities and reduce the likelihood of a successful cyberattack.
In conclusion, it is time for the U.S. Navy to stop gambling with its seapower and take proactive steps to secure its critical military systems. By investing in secure, custom microelectronics and diversifying its supply chain, the Navy can ensure that its ships remain safe and secure in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The stakes are high, but with the right investments and policies, the U.S. can maintain its position as a dominant force on the high seas.
